Op-ed by Sinan Akyol
Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest has thrown Türkiye into a state of political turbulence. As protests ripple through the country and the opposition rallies around a jailed leader, his future remains uncertain. But history offers clues. What happens to political figures who become symbols behind bars?
Three international cases offer possible futures for Türkiye’s most prominent democratic icon.
In the months leading up to the abrupt early-morning detention of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, it was a well known secret that the AKP aimed to disqualify him from a potential presidential bid. A potential ban had been hanging over him like the Sword of Damocles since December 2023, well before his open escalation as a contender against Erdoğan.
Nevertheless, the scale of the government’s current repression against İmamoğlu and his allies has far exceeded expectations -at least for anyone who still held a shred of trust in the independence of the Turkish judiciary. On the night of March 18, Istanbul University annulled his diploma, effectively crippling his presidential bid. The following morning, on March 19, police detained him under the pretext of terrorism charges; and four days later, he was formally arrested for corruption. The consequent wave of massive protests has put Türkiye to a standstill and may have elevated Imamoğlu to the status of an icon for Turkish democracy.
Becoming an icon for a cause can be a dangerous fate for an imprisoned politician: while it may inspire readers of history books, it is difficult to steer the masses and lead a movement from behind bars. Moreover, the weight of an icon’s name makes it more attractive for authoritarian governments to extend their prison time. This raises the question of İmamoğlu’s political future: how do imprisoned leaders of mass movements fare in the remainder of their careers?
While İmamoğlu’s case is unique in post–Cold War Turkish political history, many parallels can be found elsewhere in the world. İmamoğlu solidified his legitimacy as the de facto leader of the opposition in the popular primaries held on March 24, where over 15 million voters turned out to endorse his candidacy. But what comes next for him? While the increasingly tumultuous landscape of Turkish politics makes speculation difficult, insights can still be drawn from similar cases abroad. Three such cases can help us envision potential trajectories for İmamoğlu’s political future: Brazil’s current president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Belarus’ opposition figure Babaryka, and Pakistan’s still-imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
A comparison between Pakistan and Türkiye in terms of authoritarianism is laced with irony: Erdoğan’s path to authoritarian rule involved sidelining a powerful military, whereas in Pakistan, it is the military that is sidelining an elected populist, Imran Khan. Khan, an immensely popular leader, was imprisoned in 2023 but has remained a potent force in Pakistani politics. Though barred by the military from running in elections, he has continued to shape electoral outcomes through the enduring loyalty of his support base. He did not contest the 2024 elections himself, but continued backing his political party, the PTI, which failed to gain a plurality of seats in a repressed political atmosphere. His influence has not waned, yet the dominance of the pro-military status quo in Pakistan persists.
A similar scenario may now unfold for Imamoğlu: The opposition remains loyal to him, he remains loyal to the opposition, repression continues, and he carries on the struggle from behind the bars. Like Imran Khan’s case, a tangible political equilibrium, whether through İmamoğlu’s release or his decline into political irrelevance, may be unlikely to happen soon. The best way to describe Khan’s situation right now would be: “limbo and repression”. İmamoğlu’s captors are likely aware that this scenario works relatively in their favor and may aim to achieve it by wearing down the protestors. On the other hand, if demonstrations continue at this scale, the government may be forced to pursue some form of political resolution in order to restore business as usual.
The prospect of İmamoğlu clinging to political relevance from prison is a bleak one for democracy. Yet, the recent history of democratic backsliding offers even darker scenarios: authoritarian regimes crushing pro-democracy movements by completely silencing a democratic icon and imposing a media blackout on all his allies. This is precisely what happened to Viktar Babaryka, Belarus’s presidential hopeful against strongman Alexander Lukashenko. Widely seen as “the man” to topple a decades-long authoritarian regime, Babaryka was imprisoned on corruption charges ahead of the 2020 election: an eerily familiar move straight out of the authoritarian playbook.
Lukashenko’s government did not allow Babaryka any sort of political future.A sweeping media blackout silenced both him and his affiliates, cutting him off entirely from Belarus’s political life. He was eventually replaced by another opposition figure who also struggled under heavy repression. While Babaryka may still be remembered and admired by the country’s opposition, he has ultimately been sidelined. This is a scenario that can play out in Türkiye if the opposition cannot discipline itself against the intensifying repression and fail to come up with a sustainable strategy to resist it. The momentum gathered in the first days of the pro-democracy protests in Türkiye may have caused the government to backtrack on the repression, and to possibly postpone or cancel the appointment of a caretaker mayor to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. In other words, the Babaryka scenario may, for now, have been averted: İmamoğlu is still widely seen as the unifying symbol of a cross-partisan coalition, and the CHP has formally declared him as their presidential nominee.Nevertheless, a descent into Babaryka-style repression remains a distasteful yet real possibility: especially if the opposition fails to hold its ground.
If there is hope in İmamoğlu’s imprisonment, it might lie in the precedent set by Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula’s political journey -from the presidency to prison and back again- is anything but an easy road. Accused of corruption, Lula’s government was at the target of a series of judicial interventions into Brazil’s political life, now seen by many as politically motivated. The use of lawfare against politicians from Brazil’s social democratic Workers’ Party, including Lula, paved the way for the right-wing populist government of Jair Bolsonaro. Throughout this process, many Brazilians believed in Lula’s innocence and viewed him as the best hope for a democratic, progressive Brazil. While imprisoned, he delegated the electoral fight against Bolsonaro to an ally, and after Bolsonaro’s victory, continued to campaign for acquittal. Ultimately, Lula was released and went on to defeat Bolsonaro in a historic election victory.
Türkiye’s judiciary is in dire straits, and compared to Brazil, authoritarianism is much more rampant. This makes a smooth acquital process very hard for İmamoğlu, but like Lula, he probably will retain his loyal support base. The energy of Türkiye’s pro-democracy movement will aid his struggle behind the bars, and even if the opposition is forced to replace his name on the ballot, the weight of the İmamoğlu brand will help the opposition. Lula has redeemed himself during Bolosonaro’s tenure. It is very uncertain whether that is possible in Erdoğan’s Türkiye, but the pro-Lula and pro-İmamoğlu movements share a common sort of dynamism, as well as a common purpose: using the name of a democratic icon for a broader poitical struggle.
İmamoğlu’s political future could unfold in several directions: a prolonged limbo without foreseeable resolution, deeper repression, or eventual redemption. Ultimately, however, it won’t be İmamoğlu who determines the terms of the politics of imprisonment: it will be the movement that rallies behind him, and above all, the protestors who fill the squares and streets of Turkish cities. The protests of the past two weeks are almost unprecedented in recent Turkish history in terms of their diversity, hope, anger, and resolution in the face of extreme adversity. The crowds going to the booths in the CHP’s presidential primary and protesting in Istanbul’s saraçhane square have to remain persistent and disciplined if they want to prevent a Babaryka scenario or an Imran Khan scenario.
İmamoğlu’s fate now hinges less on the judiciary than on the streets. Whether he ends up sidelined, stuck in limbo, or redeemed through struggle, will depend on the movement his name inspires. The coming weeks will determine not just his trajectory, but the direction of Turkish democracy itself.
The views expressed in this article do not represent the institution the author works for or Scrolli.
Sinan Akyol is a researcher with a background in public opinion analysis. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from LSE, where he focused on comparative political behaviour and data-driven analysis. Currently working in the market research industry, he applies his expertise to uncover public opinion trends and political elite behaviour.
